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Why the Ability Hypothesis is best forgotten

According to the knowledge argument, physicalism fails because when physically omniscient Mary first sees red, her gain in phenomenal knowledge involves a gain in factual knowledge. Thus not all facts are physical facts. According to the ability hypothesis, the knowledge argument fails because Mary only acquires abilities to imagine, remember and recognise redness, and not new factual knowledge. I argue that reducing Mary’s new knowledge to abilities does not affect the issue of whether she also learns factually: I show that gaining specific new phenomenal knowledge is required for acquiring abilities of the relevant kind. Phenomenal knowledge being basic to abilities, and not vice versa, it is left an open question whether someone who acquires such abilities also learns something factual. The answer depends on whether the new phenomenal knowledge involved is factual. But this is the same question we wanted to settle when first considering the knowledge argument. The ability hypothesis, therefore, has offered us no dialectical progress with the knowledge argument, and is best forgotten.

I. Introduction
When Mary’s eyes first light upon a red tomato, according to the knowledge argument against physicalism [Jackson 1982, 1986], she learns the fact of what an experience of redness is like. She could not know this fact before seeing the tomato, having always been imprisoned in a black and white laboratory. From this laboratory though, being incredibly smart and so on, she was able to accumulate every physical/scientific fact relevant to the workings of colour vision; using black and white textbooks, television and such. But none of this information sufficed to tell Mary what seeing red would be like ahead of time, we are told. Thus, concludes the argument, the fact that Mary learns when she sees the tomato is a non-physical fact, rendering physicalism false.​[1]​

According to the ability hypothesis (AH) [Lewis 1983, 1988/2004; Nemirow 1980, 1990], the knowledge argument fails. Proponents of AH claim the knowledge Mary gains upon seeing red is not of any new fact, but is instead comprised of a set of new abilities. And since Mary encounters no new fact, the story goes, physicalism is not threatened. For no fact is demonstrated such that it is missing from her complete list of physical/scientific facts.

AH was the first major response to the knowledge argument, but it is nowadays shunned by defenders of physicalism, who prefer other strategies.​[2]​ Neither, however, is the theory generally held to be defunct. This leaves open the possibility that it might be re-deployed in physicalism’s cause. And indeed this is what has recently happened, as Frank Jackson—Mary’s creator, now a converted physicalist—has turned to AH to complete his case against his earlier anti-physicalist argument [2003]. Laurence Nemirow, too, has recently written in defence of the doctrine he helped create, detailing the apparent failures of its would-be refutations [2007].

In fact, a proper examination should end this uprising, and consign AH to history. The problem with the hypothesis, in short, is that even if correct it does nothing to touch the knowledge argument. For even if what Mary learns can be parsed as new abilities, this does not affect the question whether she learns a new fact. It is not that the hypothesis that Mary only gains abilities is wrong; worse, it is simply irrelevant to the issue it is meant to settle. 

Two main sections follow. Next I look in detail at AH, explaining how it functions internally and in context. This exposes its two ‘faces’—one inner, one looking out to the broader discussion—and generates two broad routes of attack, corresponding to each face. One might argue that AH on its own terms is false, that Mary’s new knowledge cannot—for whatever reason—be reduced to ability. Alternatively, one might argue that even if this reduction is possible it does not ensure Mary’s new knowledge is fact-free, as defense of physicalism requires. The latter is my preferred strategy, for reasons that I explain.







II. The Ability Hypothesis
II.i. The Doctrine
On AH, gaining knowledge of what an experience is like is acquiring a set of abilities regarding that experience. Proponents disagree over which abilities knowing what it is like is to be identified with, however. Lewis and Nemirow hold that knowing what it is like is the conjunction of being able to remember, imagine and recognise an experience. But Mellor [1993], for example, argues that the ability to imagine the experience alone is necessary and sufficient.​[4]​ We begin with Lewis and Nemirow’s proposal in play, since it remains the most popular formulation of the general position.

So, the Lewis-Nemirow abilities: Consider Jill’s first gustatory encounter with wasabi: the fiery-tasting, green, horseradish paste. Wasabi on her tongue, and messages conveyed to her brain, Jill knows what it is like to taste wasabi. And after experiencing the flavour, she can remember what wasabi tastes like. She now has the ability to call to mind the phenomenal character of the taste that ruined her sushi. This is an ability that Jill did not have, and, barring Lewis’ super-neurosurgery or magic, could not have had prior to tasting wasabi. It is an ability that goes hand in hand with knowing what that experience is like. 

Arguably, being able to remember an experience entails being able to imagine it. If one can remember it, one can simulate having the experience in a way that bears close resemblance to the phenomenology of the original episode.​[5]​ Now, if reference to this episode is removed—say Jill forgets when she first tasted wasabi—then what Jill does when she simulates the phenomenology of tasting wasabi is the same, from her point of view, as what goes into imagining that experience. There is no focus on any past event, only on mocking up certain phenomenology. Further, famously, the imaginative ability one gains when one learns what an experience is like is not limited to rehearsing that experience, simpliciter. One is now able to recombine experiences into new composites that one has not experienced. So, since Jill now knows the flavours of wasabi and of chips, she can imagine what chips with wasabi tastes like, and knows she (probably, we can be wrong about these things) wouldn’t like them.

The third ability gained, for Lewis and Nemirow, is the ability to recognise an experience if it comes again. If someone sneaks some wasabi into Jill’s food, she will be able to identify her taste sensation, to know this is the flavour of wasabi again. Even if she fails to know that wasabi is called ‘wasabi’, she will at least be able to note a flavour she has experienced before, however she thinks about it: ‘that horrid green stuff’ or ‘I know this terrible flavour from somewhere...’

According to ability hypothesists (henceforth: Hypothesists) who follow Lewis and Nemirow, acquiring these abilities regarding some experience (always) constitutes gaining knowledge of what that experience is like. This attempt at reduction comprises what I call AH’s ‘inner face’.​[6]​ It is important to see, however, that not enough has yet been said to challenge an interpretation of the knowledge argument on which Mary gains new factual knowledge when she sees red. For one might think what happens to Mary is that she gains abilities the acquisition of which necessarily involves learning a new fact—in which case physicalism would again be threatened. Proponents of AH must therefore maintain, additionally, that acquisition of the relevant abilities does not involve new factual knowledge.

Lewis’ account is nuanced on this matter: He concedes that some “aspects of ability are, purely and simply, a matter of information. If you want to know how to open the combination lock on the bank vault, information is all you need” [1988/2004: 100]. But if abilities, at least sometimes, involve information—knowledge of fact—then how are we to know that Mary’s new abilities are ones that don’t involve new factual knowledge in their acquisition, as opposed to ones that do? Lewis tells us: “It remains that there are aspects of ability that do not consist simply of possession of information, and that we do call knowledge. The ability hypothesis holds that knowing what an experience is like is that sort of knowledge.” [Ibid.].     

It is unclear here whether the kind of ability Lewis has in mind is to be thought of as entirely fact-free, or as partially, but not completely fact-involving. This matter would issue in some complications, but thankfully we need not consider it further here. For the essential point for Hypothesists must be that in learning what redness is like, Mary does not add to her stock of factual knowledge, even if she relies upon some of it to install her new abilities. So we can focus on the question of whether, in gaining the Lewis-Nemirow abilities with regard to the experience of redness, Mary increases her factual knowledge. This question Hypothesists must answer in the negative.

It follows that it is not entailed by AH’s inner face alone—that learning what it is like is reducible to gaining abilities—that Mary’s new knowledge is fact-free in the relevant sense. Hypothesists must add an extra statement, to the effect that the new ability-knowledge added to Mary’s factual physical knowledge when she learns what redness is like itself involves no new fact. But where is the support for this claim? Support for it in fact derives from AH’s ‘outer face’, as we now see.
II.ii. How the Ability Hypothesis Functions in Context
Hypothesists are fond of their analogies. Nemirow compares knowing what it is like to being able to wiggle one’s ears. For Lewis being able to use chopsticks provides a parallel. And Mellor thinks what Mary learns is relevantly similar to knowing how to ride a bike. What is the point of these comparisons?

First, what goes into having each of the above abilities can indeed be considered knowledge of a sort, thus underlining the plausibility and explanatory adequacy of reducing Mary’s new knowledge to abilities. Second, more relevant here, it is important to see that what makes Mary’s new knowledge worrying for physicalism is that it cannot be attained through any amount of academic study. Plausibly, all physical knowledge is attainable by academic means. Hence, any knowledge Mary can attain exclusively through other means might appear to be physicalism-violating. But proponents of AH point out that their comparison ability cannot be learned academically either, and that no one thinks there is anything mysterious or non-physical about that. The idea is to assimilate what Mary learns to abilities of this kind, thereby providing a mundane explanation of why knowing what it is like eludes her efforts in monochromia. 

One more point must be added to flesh out the comparisons, and render AH potent against the knowledge argument. This is the claim that what goes into mastery of the comparison abilities does not involve gaining factual knowledge. For if it did, given that the topic is information putatively not included in Mary’s physical catalogue, her gain of this sort of ability knowledge would entail non-physical facts. Drawing his favoured comparison, Mellor says that knowing what it is like “is like knowing how to ride a bicycle.” for “I cannot state the fact I know then either, because there is no such fact to state...no one thinks it mysterious that I cannot say what fact my knowing how to ride a bicycle is knowledge of: it is too obvious that there is no such fact” [1993:8].   

In sum, the Hypothesists’ strategy is to equate what Mary learns with a class or kind of abilities the having of which we also count as knowledge. If what Mary learns is just a cluster of such abilities, this explains without fuss why it is not learnable under academic conditions. Add to this the claim that the knowledge one gains when one acquires abilities of this kind is non-factual knowledge, and one has apparently explained how Mary could fail to be able to know what it is like through learning about physical facts, while avoiding the conclusion that her finally becoming knowledgeable acquainted her with any new, and so non-physical, fact.
II.iii. The Two Faces 
Having analysed its inner and outer faces, AH can now be expressed as the conjunction of three claims:

Reduction (R): Mary’s gain in knowledge of what it is like to experience redness is reducible to a gain of abilities. (On the Lewis-Nemirow story, abilities to remember, imagine and recognise redness)





Fact-Freeness (F): Acquiring abilities like those mentioned in C does not involve gaining knowledge of any fact.

Put in the terms we have used so far, thesis R constitutes AH’s inner face, and the conjunction of C and F its outer face. The inner face represents the reductive claim that is at the heart of AH. The outer face reveals that, given the truth of the reductive claim, Mary’s new knowledge is fact-free, in the sense of not adding to her stock of factual knowledge. It is outward-facing because it relies on comparisons that bring in considerations and intuitions from outside the strict scope of what happens to Mary.

Taken as premises of an argument, R, C and F together entail that Mary’s gain of knowledge of what redness is like involves learning no new fact, thus safeguarding physicalism. This, I suggest, is how AH is meant to function as a defence against the knowledge argument.
II.iv. The State of Play, and the Way Forward
Extant objections to AH tend to argue that Mary’s new phenomenal knowledge is not reducible to abilities, either because this knowledge is to some extent logically independent of having the relevant abilities,​[7]​ or because there exists no genuine genre of fact-free ability-knowledge to which to reduce what Mary learns,​[8]​ or because it is argued directly that what Mary learns is not ability, but is factual.​[9]​ My perspective on such strategies is that they take an unnecessarily strong line, which is therefore harder to motivate and defend, with the result that their criticisms of AH struggle for decisiveness. There is not the space here to defend this diagnosis by examining accounts in detail. But that the diagnosis holds is confirmed by the fact that Nemirow was recently able to claim to rejuvenate AH by means of a single article responding to a selection of such criticisms, and that Jackson has felt sufficiently comfortable about the viability of AH to make it part of his new recipe against the knowledge argument without supplying any specific new defence of the doctrine. 

What the critical approaches mentioned have in common is that they attempt, as it were, a direct refutation of AH; usually by challenging thesis R in one way or another. But such approaches inevitably run into a plain clash of intuitions: For example, the critic intuits that Mary learns a fact, for whichever reason, and the defender of AH just denies this. Alternatively, the critic tries to provide cases where knowing what it is like exists without abilities, or vice versa. But these are open, again, to simple denial from the defender of AH, who differs in his intuitions about the cases. This has left the debate around AH in something of a gridlock, with progress difficult to foresee as things stand. Disputants are at the point of talking past each other; such is the direct, basic and, most problematically: intuitive nature of their disagreement. My strategy in the next section differs from most existing attacks on AH, in allowing the Hypothesists their reductive claim (R), and by not seeking to prove that what Mary learns must be factual. Instead, I argue that capturing what Mary learns as new abilities does nothing to touch the question whether she learns factually. This weaker line of attack, if its reasoning is correct, has more chance in the dialectical bear-pit. For it does not dispute the core claims and intuitions important to Hypothesists as they build their case. Instead, it simply urges that these claims do not provide the conclusion Hypothesists take them to. The central argument of this paper allows that knowing what it is like might be reducible to abilities. But this will not help the Hypothesist against the knowledge argument. AH, therefore, whether right or wrong in its reductive claim, is simply irrelevant to discussion of physicalism, and is to be discarded. 

III. Why the Ability Hypothesis is Best Forgotten
III.i. The Dialectic
Conceding for argument’s sake the truth of R, on the grounds that attacking it leads us into murky waters, let us focus instead on thesis F of AH:​[10]​ 

(F): Acquiring abilities like those mentioned in C does not involve gaining knowledge of any fact.

While I grant that what Mary learns when she learns what redness is like may be new abilities, and that these abilities may be relevantly similar to being able to ride a bike (and so on) I deny that these points would suffice to show that Mary’s new knowledge doesn’t involve her learning any new fact. I argue that the best AH can do is to leave this issue entirely open.

The Hypothesist takes the abilities Mary acquires to belong to a wider genre that we might call ‘non-factual abilities’; these are abilities the acquisition of which involves learning no new fact. The placement of Mary’s new knowledge within this genre removes the tendency to see its gain as fact-involving, and so the trouble for physicalism. The explanatory order presupposed is crucial, however: it is taken that non-factual abilities exist, and that Mary’s learning can be captured in terms of them. This is how her encounter with redness is washed free of factual content. But we will now see reasons to reverse the explanatory order. Close examination of the Hypothesists’ comparison abilities reveals a so far unremarked-upon commonality with the process undergone by Mary. Noting this helps us see that Mary’s case is in an important sense more philosophically primitive than these analogies, with the result that our analytical attention must re-focus on her: If we naively consider that Mary gains factual knowledge when she learns what it is like, we will have to infer that acquiring the abilities invoked by Hypothesists essentially involves gaining factual knowledge as well. And conversely. This means that reduction of Mary’s knowledge to abilities does nothing to render it non-factual; rather, all still hangs on our judgement about her meeting with the tomato. The questions of reducibility to ability and of factual content are orthogonal. 
III.ii. What is Involved in Lewis-Nemirow-Mellor Abilities
Why will no amount of academic learning enable one to ride a bike? There is much to learn about bike-riding from the classroom. One can learn the structure of bicycles, and how they are propelled using pedal and chain. One can see from its structure that a bicycle balances along its longest axis, if kept relatively upright. Then one can factor in one’s weight, and do a little physics to discover how hard to pedal, and how upright to stay, to keep the bicycle balanced while expending minimum energy. A longer, more detailed version of some such story would capture, objectively speaking, all that goes into successful bike-riding. But what would happen to someone who, like Mary, swapped the classroom for first-hand experience of their object of study, in this case?

We expect that what would happen to this person is what happens to all first time bike riders. They would fall off. Following their account of the elusiveness of Mary’s new knowledge, Lewis, Nemirow and Mellor would seem happy to explain this result by saying that what this student requires is the ability to ride a bike, and that abilities cannot be acquired except through practice. They cannot be had through academic study. But this explanation has a stipulative whiff. One could just take ability in these theorists’ sense if one wished. But we are left wanting to know: why does this type of knowledge elude academic study? What is it about ability that escapes the classroom, and is only available in a hands-on way? What our trio offer us seems little better than re-description of the puzzle such knowledge poses. Thankfully, we can say more.

The first-time bike rider falls off, of course, because they lose their balance. Balancing is essential to riding, and mastery of it can only come through practice. Saying this is not to say anything that yet counts against the Hypothesists. They can put the point by saying the ability to keep one’s balance is a vital component of the ability to ride a bike, if we may talk this way. But consider the kind of knowledge that is involved in learning how to keep your balance on a bike. I claim it depends upon cognitively monitoring the quality of new phenomenal states. 

One reason why keeping your balance when riding is essential is because it frees senses to attend to other important matters. You can also get some way towards maintaining the bike upright by looking to check that the horizon is suitably horizontal. The trouble with this approach is that too much time spent focusing on the attitude of the horizon can mean too little spent on the trajectory of an oncoming dog, with a nasty collision as upshot. Good bike riders don’t use what they see as a guide to whether they are balanced; they use their eyes to see what’s coming and to find their way. What keeps them up instead is their sense of balance, how balanced they feel.

What occurs, at least initially, is a process of matching: matching of states of the bike to new phenomenal balance-states. One tries to ride, and falls off. One tries again, falls again. Quickly one learns that a certain feeling—in fact that of toppling—means being imminently in for a tumble and cut arm. Conversely, keeping the bike, however fleetingly, within acceptable parameters of uprightness comes with its own distinctive new sensation: that of undisturbed equilibrium, of not being impinged upon by overpowering forces to either side. So, one tries to maintain the equilibrium feeling while practising, and whenever one feels the toppling begin to creep in, one knows corrective action must be taken. Fairly soon, you don’t ever have to look down, or at the horizon. You know the feeling of undisturbed equilibrium is tracking the bike’s uprightness, and that all is well while it is maintained. In fact, when you become genuinely competent you stop having to pay attention at all to the newly-mastered phenomenology of bicycle-balance. Instead, monitoring becomes implicit, and you may only notice it distinctly when the sensation becomes that of being on the way to a fall. 
 
There is no skulking internalism here. The claim is not that a person has attention directed solely inwards when riding a bike, that what he thinks about is what‘s happening inside. One’s focus is clearly on the bike, and on ensuring correct rider-bike-world interactions; in fact this account is readily compatible with a view of the phenomenal as representational of bodily and external states. The important claim is that someone​[11]​ successfully learns how to ride a bike at least in (ineliminable) part by paying the right attention—if only a background monitoring—to the novel character of his phenomenal balance states. This, I think, is close to common sense.
III.iii. Why the Classroom doesn’t suffice: A Better Explanation
With this account in hand, a more illuminating explanation can now be given of why the ability to ride a bike escapes academic study, more illuminating than stopping at the notion that abilities, for whatever reason, require practice. If the above is correct, then the bike rider is in a situation that strikingly resembles Mary’s, to a far greater extent than has been recognised. Mary is barred from having abilities to remember, imagine and recognise the experience of redness because she hasn’t yet had the required phenomenal state. But it seems the bike rider is barred from having the ability to ride a bike (before practising) because he too has not yet had certain required phenomenal states: He has not yet experienced how it feels to balance on a bike, so as to match his feelings of balance with the bike’s uprightness.

This suggests it is an agent’s lack of phenomenal knowledge—that is, more precisely, their lack of acquaintance with the quality of specific states of sensation—that entails the impossibility of their acquiring abilities in the classroom. And now we can improve on the Hypothesists’ account in two respects, giving a deeper, and more unified explanation of the elusiveness of abilities for the inexperienced but academically studious: 

Our explanation is deeper because now we needn’t halt at the pronouncement that Mary and the bike rider gain abilities, and that abilities cannot be gained from books. It is faintly mysterious why this should be, and we have indicated the desirability of further explanation. Now we can stress that Mary’s new abilities allow her to, in some sense, manipulate her phenomenology: for remembering, imagining and recognising a phenomenal state are well thought of as kinds of mental operation upon that state. This said, it makes sense that Mary cannot have the abilities with respect to a phenomenal state until she is acquainted with it; that is, until she experiences what it is like and cognises it. And in her case this must await her meeting with the tomato. The bike rider, similarly, needs to perform mental operations upon the (novel) sensations of balance: matching these phenomenal states with the physical states of falling and not falling, in order to acquire the ability to track his bike’s uprightness. So he must become acquainted with phenomenal states of balancing and not balancing on his bike, which means experiencing how these feel. The lesson Mary teaches is that this cannot happen from the classroom; thus it is made more comprehensible why academic study, in fact why anything short of experience, will not give the cyclist the ability to ride. 

The explanation is more unified because now we needn’t think of what prevents Mary gaining her abilities, and the bike rider gaining his, as heterogeneous. On the Lewis-Nemirow-Mellor picture, we are left with the explanation that both seek abilities, and abilities cannot be gained academically. But abilities to play with phenomenology and to ride a bike are on the face of it quite different. So if we wonder what makes it so in each case that the abilities cannot be acquired, we are left groping: baffled by the difference between the scenarios, while tempted to look for a unifying explanation by the claim that ability is both times involved. Now we can hold that the bike rider can’t possess his ability until he rides a bike for the same reason that Mary cannot imagine (etc.) redness until she experiences it. The knowledge that goes into acquiring the ability to ride a bike involves acquaintance with new experiential states: how it feels to be balanced or unbalanced on a bicycle. And the moral from Mary’s predicament is that one cannot be qualitatively acquainted with experiential states short of having them. So the bike rider must wait on some phenomenal experience, which underwrites the ability he’s in the market to gain. Just like Mary. 

On this account, it turns out that the elusiveness of abilities from academic study is derived from the elusiveness of phenomenal knowledge: it is because acquiring the relevant abilities involves knowing what certain experiences are like that the abilities elude the classroom—these inherit their elusiveness from the elusiveness of the phenomenal knowledge they depend upon. It is in this sense that Mary’s encounter with the phenomenology of redness is epistemically prior to the Hypothesists’ cases of ability-knowledge. Phenomenal knowledge, of the kind Mary gains, is basic to the abilities cited, qua necessary ground or component. It seems that abilities essentially connected with a phenomenal state can only come into operation once the character of the phenomenal state involved is grasped by the subject/agent. This reverses the order of explanatory priority presented to us by the Hypothesists, on whose account (Mary’s) phenomenal knowledge was to be understood in terms of having abilities. 

This result entails that the factuality of ability-knowledge hangs on judgement about the factuality of Mary-style phenomenal learning, rendering AH useless. So I will claim. However, all I have done so far is analyse one of the Hypothesists’ examples;    Mellor’s case of bike-riding. To support the general claim that the ability-knowledge invoked by Hypothesists is epistemically posterior to the kind of phenomenal knowledge Mary gains, we must confirm that the account generalises. Do Lewis and Nemirow’s cases fit, and is there anything to be said of a broader sort about the kinds of knowledge at issue?
III.iv. General Application 
The account transfers smoothly from Mellor’s example to those of Lewis and Nemirow: using chopsticks, and ear-wiggling. Just as one needs to learn how balance-phenomenology feels under scenarios of uprightness and falling to ride a bike, so one needs to get used to how chopsticks feel when they are being used correctly if one ever hopes to enjoy one’s Chinese meal. Beginner chopstick-users are very like beginner bike-riders: their gaze tends to be intently focused on their instrument to monitor correct usage, and this gets in the way of wholehearted participation in the activity. After a while though, one can tell by the feel of the fingers whether all is in place, and the eyes can turn to selecting morsels to seize. A constant—again, background—checking process then activates, keeping unobtrusive track of how the chopsticks feel in the hand. This is evident from the fact that one can tell immediately—without looking, and without grasping unsuccessfully for food—if the sticks fall into even a slightly less happy position with respect to their optimum parameters. Such adeptness perhaps requires some experience. But it precisely seems to be phenomenal knowledge of the kind of interest to us that this experience delivers. 

Ear-wiggling involves manipulation of no external instrument, yet familiar principles apply. The example appears more challenging, as one might think this activity requires no ‘matching’ of phenomenology to successful practice, as the others do. Surely, one can either move the requisite muscles or one cannot? But this would be the suggestion of at best an amateurish wiggler. There is a sense in which one can either move the ears or one cannot, the same sense in which one is either able to move one’s legs or one is not. But the ability to move one’s legs does not seem of the kind that interests the Hypothesists, and which is to provide a parallel for what Mary learns. For one does not really learn to move one’s legs, simply to move them: one just can or cannot. Abilities in this sense, like the ability to lift 100 kilos, or to blink, are better denoted capacities: they concern the physical potential of one’s body; what is within its immediate power. In contrast, the Hypothesists’ abilities are better thought of as skills. One must certainly have the physical capacity for these skills in the first place, else one will get nowhere in learning them. But there is more to them than mere capacity; one must, after all, learn something, or practise something, to really be said to acquire the abilities in question. When Mellor says experience is the best teacher, it of course follows that experience teaches us something. My claim is that when it comes to skills, this something involves irreducible phenomenal knowledge.

Our concern, and Nemirow’s, is not with the capacity to ear-wiggle, with whether muscles are suitably hooked-up so as to move ears. Rather, Nemirow intends ear-wiggling qua learned skill to be compared with what Mary learns. And in this sense, ear-wiggling is clearly much like bike-riding and chopstick-using. Anyone who can wiggle well knows it is a skill usefully aided by—embarrassingly—a mirror. It’s not enough to haphazardly shift ears to impress onlookers; this is the province of she who merely has the capacity to ear-wiggle. The skilled wiggler knows she must at least approximate circles with her ear movements. A mirror helps here. You move the ears, and check in the mirror to see where they go. Then, by seeing the ears describe circles and noting how this feels, you come to know when they are performing the desired configuration without checking on them visually. How? You learn to feel—from the inside, as it were—that the ears are in the right place; just as one feels one is upright on a bike, or has chopsticks correctly grasped. Qua ability in the sense of skill, then, ear-wiggling appears to depend upon new phenomenal knowledge just in the way the other two cases do.

The Hypothesists’ cases support the claim that phenomenal knowledge underwrites ability-knowledge. To be more precise, in each case where a new ability is acquired, specific new phenomenal states must be learned about, so that they can be correlated with successful carrying-out of the activity in question. Would-be bike-riders must master how it feels to balance on a bike, would-be chopstick-users must get a grip on how chopsticks feel when deployed correctly in the hand, and would-be ear-wigglers must learn the way their ears feel when performing appropriately co-ordinated and entertaining manoeuvres. In each example, knowledge of novel sensations grounds the acquisition of new abilities, just as is the case with Mary. Thus, I conclude, phenomenal knowledge is basic to ability-knowledge, and not vice-versa. So there is no prospect, therefore, of reducing phenomenal knowledge to bare abilities, as Hypothesists wish. One cannot reduce an item to something else that depends in the first place upon that item, not in the sense of saying that the item in question is nothing but this something else, which is the sense of ‘reduction’ required by Hypothesists. In a given case, the new phenomenal knowledge gained may be thought of as part of (what went into acquiring) the new ability, certainly, so that it can be correct to say that what the agent gained was a new ability. But this leaves entirely open what the nature of that phenomenal knowledge in itself is; notably, whether it is of a factual or non-factual nature.

However, an obvious objection suggests itself at this point: Perhaps Lewis and co. merely picked unfortunate examples; surely there exist relevant cases of ability for Hypothesists to recruit in their quest to reduce Mary’s knowledge that don’t depend upon phenomenal knowledge, in the sense that their acquisition requires gaining it? Such examples, if they can be found, would avoid the explanatory difficulty I have highlighted.

A problem here is knowing quite what the relevant sense of ‘ability’ is meant to be. Our trio of Hypothesists never clarify what they mean by the term, nor do they detail the salient characteristics of their analogies. Yet it is striking that they all select abilities that are skill-involving. These selections, as such, obviously have the important feature of not being learnable academically, providing the main parallel with Mary’s knowledge. I suggest the choice of skills is no accident in a further regard. For what the Hypothesists claim Mary gains are also skills, in a broad sense of the term. As we have noted, they require her to perform operations—albeit of a mental type—on certain items, phenomenal states, which can be more or less successful. Being able to do better or worse at an activity is characteristic of it being skill-involving, in the broad sense. And Mary may not, for example, be adept at faithfully imagining the experience of red, while reliably recognising it may be much easier for her. It happens that what Mary must operate on are phenomenal states, whereas with Lewis-Nemirow-Mellor cases it is physical objects (ostensibly) that are manipulated. But this difference in objects signifies no difference in the kind of activity engaged in that matters here. In both kinds of case, a more or less successful manipulation is called for. Further, my claim has been that skills of the Hypothesists’ chosen kind require as ground or component the kind of operation upon phenomenal states that is the core of what Mary does—in order for the matching process to get underway. If this analysis is correct of the common features of Mary’s abilities and those chosen as comparisons by the Hypothesists, any further case of ability put forward as an analogy should also fit our account, if it meets the intuitive parameters for comparison with knowing what it is like; if it is, in the broad sense, a skill.

There is more to say here. AH’s target is the knowledge argument; specifically, what happens to Mary. The idea is to offer a fact-free genre of knowledge​[12]​ into which to collapse the knowledge Mary gains when she learns what it is like. It follows that we, and Hypothesists, are all the time interested in what goes into acquiring ability-knowledge for people. Mary is a person, a human being, built, functioning and experiencing as such. Any parallel suggested for her learning about the experience of redness must therefore respect this; the parallel suggested must centre on human experience, the human point of view, as the paradigm. So there are, likely, ‘abilities’ worthy of the name that lie outside the purview of this discussion and which, if they elude our analysis and the argument built upon it, do so by not being relevant, by virtue of not being closely enough related to the human point of view. Consider one such: Imagine a robot constructed to ride a bike effectively. One might say, without stretching the term I think, that this robot has the ability to bike ride. And yet, surely the robot does not have phenomenal experience.​[13]​ Thus this might appear to be a case of ability that does not depend upon phenomenal knowledge, and so avoids the dialectical trap set here. Why not say that Mary acquires this kind of ability?

However, an ability of this type offers no aid to the would-be reducer of Mary’s knowledge. It could never be said that Mary knows what it is like to experience redness in the same sense that the robot knows how to ride a bike, for the gulf between the two is too glaring. More generally though: someone might claim that it is not that new phenomenal knowledge is a necessary constituent of acquiring abilities, rather our analysis looks plausible only because it is conscious human beings like us that feature in examples considered. Of course such beings are bound to rely on phenomenal knowledge to put in place new abilities, given the way that they (the beings) function. But this is to focus on a human contingency, and to ignore the fact that there is a perfectly good sense of ‘ability’ that need not dirty its hands with phenomenal knowledge at all. And, the objection continues, it is this kind of ability that Mary acquires when she learns what it is like.

The mistake here, and with the robot, is clear. Any abilities proposed as parallels for Mary’s knowledge must, it stands to reason, be human-like abilities, for these are the abilities Mary acquires; decidedly not abilities that (by stipulation) involve no phenomenal experience at all. The issue, to emphasise, is what goes into gaining knowledge of the type that Mary actually gains; does this involve new factual knowledge or not?  And Mary is, notoriously, a conscious human being, a person. For the question that the knowledge argument poses is whether human conscious experience is physically reducible.  It will not be to the point, therefore, to turn to look outside of the way that people gain abilities in order to devise counterexamples. We can therefore forget any objection based on the sense in which robots, or for that matter zombies, might be able to ride a bike, and so on. Theirs would be, trivially, phenomenology-free ability, and so not relevant; or rather, question-begging. It would be as good an objection to the thesis that bats must flap their wings in order to take off and fly to point out that airplanes achieve flight without any flapping at all, so that flying doesn’t involve flapping. Such a move would, in Mary’s case, simply constitute a change of subject (!).

The discussion above enables better triangulation of the kind of knowledge at issue. The question is: What is the unitary sense of ‘ability’ that embraces what is common to the Hypothesists’ cases and Mary’s? My precise claim is that when people acquire abilities by learning, which is to say these are skills not mere capacities, they require specific new phenomenal knowledge, which grounds these abilities. Mary’s abilities are to manipulate phenomenal states, where the Hypothesists’ cases involve external objects. But all share a core element of mental operations upon particular, novel, phenomenal states. It follows that any new case suggested by Hypothesists, if intended to be of the same type as the analogies considered so far, will have to be a skilled, human-like ability. Acquiring this ability will, therefore, depend upon gaining new phenomenal knowledge in the manner described.

In light of this argument that what we’ve said about the Hypothesists’ favourite cases goes for other relevant cases that may be suggested, let me deal with one further proposed counterexample. Is not the ability to speak relevantly similar to Mary’s abilities, yet not dependent upon new phenomenal knowledge for its acquisition?​[14]​ 

This case will seem troublesome, however, only if one commits the equivocation we noted when discussing ear-wiggling. For there is a sense in which the ability to speak is a mere capacity: one either can or cannot move one’s mouth in the various complex ways that produce acceptable sounds. And. arguably, this ability to speak requires no phenomenal knowledge. But this is not a sense of being able to speak that is skill-involving, as it must be if it is to be relevant to Mary. And it is plausible that the sense of having the ability to speak that is skill-involving fits our account perfectly well. 

It is admittedly difficult for adult, accomplished, speakers to see this, so effortless is our speech. But that phenomenal knowledge underwrites skilful speech is evident when considering the learning of a new language, or the process of recovery from a speech-debilitation. Consider the difficulty of mastering the Spanish ‘e’ sound (pronounced ‘eh’) for a British English speaker. The problem is this sound requires a wide, ‘smiley’, mouth shape, whereas British English speakers are used to moving their mouths relatively little. A mirror serves again here. When you know the sound to aim at, you can check the shape of your mouth in the mirror when you get it right. The thing then is to learn, and get a good grip on, how the mouth feels when held in the right shape, and to strive for this in conversation when mirror-less. At first you have to concentrate hard on getting into the right position mouthwise, focusing consciously on the lips. One just isn’t accustomed to what feel like exaggerated mouth movements. But with practice—experience being the best teacher—this focusing fades into the background of attention, yielding a quiet feedback mechanism. At this stage one is like the competent chopsticks wielder or bike rider: the phenomenology is monitored only at the back of one’s mind, in case of slip-ups, to enable corrections.

Someone working to recover normal speech after a disabling incident is in a similar position, albeit perhaps hampered additionally by physical damage. Again, the process is of matching successful practice with the novel phenomenology that accompanies it—at first consciously, later less and less so. This trainee-speaker probably remembers the phenomenology of pre-incident speech. But aiming for this feeling in the aftermath of damage precisely does not serve to produce the right sounds, or is anyway unattainable. That is why the person must re-learn to speak, and why they must acquire knowledge of how their mouth now feels when it makes the correct shapes, or ones near enough. We who learnt to speak in childhood perhaps cannot remember going through the labour the learner of a foreign language or recovering speaker obviously does, but there seems little doubt that a similar—albeit less explicitly attended-to—process goes on. A child must, for example, check the sounds she makes against those that she hears from adults. Thus the ability to speak, in the relevant sense, is no counterexample to our analysis of what goes into acquiring ability.

We’ve seen that the Hypothesists’ cases fit our analysis; likewise, the potentially problematic ability to speak. I also argued generally that abilities providing genuine points of comparison with Mary’s will fit too. The distinction between ability in the sense of ‘capacity’, and in the (broad) sense of ‘skill’ helped here, as did reconfirming our focus on Mary, on the kind of being she is. Of course, we may expect further putative counterexamples to be raised: cases apparently involving ability in the relevant sense, but not requiring new phenomenal knowledge for their acquisition. It seems likely that such cases will either fail to be abilities sufficiently analogous to Mary’s—for example by being mere capacities—or else will yield to our analysis. One cannot, of course, say for sure; however, absent any obvious further objections, I will now take it that new phenomenal knowledge is indeed the ground of acquiring the kind of abilities relevant to discussion of Mary.
III.v. Conclusion: The Upshot for the Ability Hypothesis
Lewis, Nemirow and Mellor would add C and F to R, so as to maintain that Mary’s new phenomenal knowledge does not involve new factual learning because there is no more to it than the gain of abilities. But in fact gaining an ability of the relevant sort depends upon gaining new phenomenal knowledge. It is phenomenal knowledge that is basic in the analysis, not abilities. More metaphysically put, the type of ability Hypothesists appeal to seems to be built upon, or partially composed by, the novel phenomenal knowledge—cognition of the relevant new phenomenal state—uncovered by the agent; gaining this knowledge appears a necessary part of her acquiring such abilities. This fact serves, we noted, to neatly explain why experience is the best teacher. But if gaining new phenomenal knowledge is a crucial part of acquiring Lewis-Nemirow-Mellor abilities, then it is Mary’s case that again demands our primary focus when we consider whether learning what it is like involves learning facts.

A bike rider’s (chopstick user’s, etc.) new ability is ineliminably (for she is a person) dependent upon learning what certain new phenomenal states are like. Therefore, declaring the rider’s new knowledge an ability to ride does not settle the question of whether this knowledge involves new facts; not when the source of new facts might be the attendant new phenomenal knowledge. For this phenomenal knowledge underwrites, or perhaps partially composes, the ability to ride. It is therefore left untouched by AH—the hypothesis that what the agent acquires is ability, and there remain genuine questions about the nature of this phenomenal knowledge given the ability it helps put in place: Notably, the question whether gaining such phenomenal knowledge involves learning any new facts. If it does, then acquiring the ability to ride a bike also involves learning new facts.

Transpose to Mary. Similarly, declaring what she gains upon experiencing redness a new set of abilities doesn’t settle the question of whether she also gains factual knowledge. For her new abilities too are founded on novel phenomenal knowledge, of what it is like to experience redness. And if this phenomenal knowledge is new-fact-involving, this factual nature will bleed into the abilities she gains. It will be the case that Mary gains no more than abilities alright, but abilities the acquisition of which involves learning new facts. Therefore, it is not to the point regarding the factuality or not of what Mary learns to reduce it to abilities.

Now it becomes clear that AH is dialectically useless. For imagine it false that Mary’s new knowledge is reducible to a gain of abilities; suppose R false, in line with what some objectors to AH have argued. Still, it’s an open question whether what Mary learns when she learns what it is like is factual, a question we can only answer by considering the nature of phenomenal knowledge directly. On the other hand, imagine it true that Mary’s epistemic gain is reducible to the acquisition of abilities. Still, it’s an open question whether gaining these abilities involves learning new facts; one that can only be answered, again, by considering the nature of the novel phenomenal knowledge which grounds or composes the abilities.

Where then should we turn to decide whether phenomenal knowledge is knowledge of fact, and thus whether acquiring Lewis-Nemirow-Mellor abilities involves learning new facts (and thus whether the knowledge argument threatens physicalism here)? Well, we can only turn to someone like Mary: she has complete knowledge of physical facts, then has a novel phenomenal experience which gifts her new phenomenal knowledge and abilities. Hers is the proper case consideration of which might give us an inkling about the factuality of phenomenal knowledge, and the abilities it founds. So, AH, in effect, carries us on a loop back to consider Mary’s learning again, in order to discuss from scratch whether it ought to be considered a factual discovery or not. But this is what philosophers evaluating the knowledge argument must decide anyway; this is the old issue for the argument. Therefore, AH offers us no dialectical progress, and is best forgotten.














^1	  The argument thus relies on the implicit premise that if there are some pieces of information that cannot be physically accounted for, then physicalism as a metaphysical doctrine is false. This premise is controversial, and another source of much discussion on the knowledge argument (see for example Loar 1997 for criticism of this premise). It is not the subject of our discussion here, however, where I focus on the epistemology of what happens to Mary. For what it’s worth, I happen to think that the controversial premise is true, so that blocking the ability hypothesis as a physicalist strategy, as I do here, is significant for the dialectic.
^2	  The most popular current approach is to posit a necessary a posteriori connection between physical facts and consciousness facts. See Loar 1997 for an influential account.
^3	  Nagel famously employed this phrase (in his 1974) to draw attention to the character of phenomenal consciousness.
^4	  It should be noted that Mellor does not have the same intentions as Lewis and Nemirow. He rejects physicalism, and so does not deploy AH in order to defend it.
^5	  Though this is a commonly accepted point, Jennifer Hornsby for one denies it (in discussion). Her claim is that there is such a thing    she enjoys it    as non-phenomenal remembering. However, her situation seems to be exceptional, and for the purposes of this paper we can concentrate on what typically goes with having the various abilities that are at issue.  
^6	  It is pointed out to me (by an anonymous reviewer) that it is possible to read Nemirow (in some early passages) as proposing that knowing what an experience of (e.g.) red is like is to be identified with having abilities with respect to redness itself (construed as an external world property) rather than with respect to the experience of red. While I can see how this reading of Nemirow could arise, AH as Lewis (not to mention Mellor) intends it is clearly in line with my reading. Furthermore, Nemirow (in his 2007) defers to Lewis on the content of AH. Lastly, it would seem anyway mistaken for proponents of AH to adopt the suggested reading: In a dream, one could presumably recognise the taste of lemongrass if one experienced it. But if knowing what an experience of lemongrass is like is constituted by (inter alia) being able to recognise the taste of lemongrass qua external world property, then one couldn’t know what the taste was like in a dream. For in a dream no such external world property is present to be recognised.
^7	  See Tye 2000 and Alter 2001 for examples. Tye argues that Mary can know what it is like to experience redness at the time of experiencing it, without necessarily gaining any of the abilities with regard to the experience, due to cognitive limitations. She may not be able to remember, recognise or imagine redness once her meeting with the shade is over. Hence knowing what it is like is independent of the Lewis-Nemirow abilities, and so not reducible to them. This argument fails because it can be plausibly maintained that Mary possesses the Lewis-Nemirow abilities at the time of experiencing red, even if she loses them immediately afterwards. Nothing then shows the independence of knowing what it is like from the abilities. Alter’s argument starts out quite differently, but eventually hangs on the claim, drawn from a related discussion in Chomsky (1988), that one can retain an element of knowing what it is like even without retaining the relevant abilities, thus pursuing the same line as Tye in the end. It fails to convince on the same ground: that it is not beyond plausibility that knowledge of what it is like comes and goes with the presence of the Lewis-Nemirow abilities, thus any claimed independence between the two is at best contentious.  
^8	  For two such accounts see Snowdon 2004 and Stanley and Williamson 2001. The latter two end up with the claim that even if what Mary gains is ability, this still entails her learning some factual knowledge, given their preceding argument. But, plausible though I find the considerations these authors adduce, it is easy to see that a defender of AH will simply want to re-affirm here Lewis’ intuition that acquiring at least some forms of ability-knowledge does not involve gaining factual knowledge, and that it is such a form of knowledge that the Hypothesist hypothesises is learned by Mary. When Stanley and Williamson retort, by putting forward plausible falsifying cases, as is their overall tactic, we will end up with the straight clash of intuitions that I describe in a moment, and that I aim to circumvent.
^9	  Loar’s (1997) strategy against AH takes this form. Again, though Loar’s analysis is plausible, it too relies on intuitions of factuality relating to discussed cases of knowledge. Thus Nemirow (2007) is able, predictably, to respond simply by explaining away the factual interpretation of the cases. Nemirow’s response is hardly convincing enough to be the final word in the discussion between him and Loar, but what it succeeds in doing is forcing the issue, again, into a logjam of directly opposed intuitions, with no easy escape visible.
^10	  To proceed with my strategy of concentrating on F, I also of course grant C from this point on.
^11	  That is, a normal, phenomenally conscious person; not a zombie for example. More on this later.
^12	  In the sense of not involving the learning of any new facts in its acquisition.
^13	  Although, the robot will need to ‘perceive’ its environment, using cameras or somesuch, in order to modify its movements appropriately; to avoid obstacles, compensate for wind and so on. When one additionally bears in mind the complex ‘cognitive’ processing the whole process would involve    the rich information flowing as inputs and outputs, ‘representations’ of the scenario that would be employed etc.    it becomes less obvious that the robot wouldn’t have ‘experience’ of some kind, especially if one has functionalist sympathies. In this case a plausible, and welcome, conclusion would be that acquiring abilities tout court, in the right sense, depends upon gaining phenomenal knowledge. The robot would have to go through the same process of matching new ‘phenomenology’ to correct riding as a human rider.
^14	  The case is due to Hornsby. Since it involves a skilled, human ability, it meets the constraints just laid upon putative counterexamples. 
^15	  Another non-factual view is Conee’s [1994], on which Mary merely gains ‘acquaintance’ knowledge of what it is like; such knowledge being of the sort we have when acquainted with a person or city, says Conee. As I understand the proposal, it appears to be that Mary adds acquaintance with the experience of redness, a novel property, to her stock of knowledge. But because this acquaintance knowledge is non-factual, Mary learns no new fact and does not falsify physicalism. Conee maintains that although Mary may have known every (physical) fact about, and so been able to think about, phenomenal redness while in her black and white room, the relevant acquaintance knowledge    only obtainable by cognising the redness of an experience    was a piece of knowledge she was inevitably missing. I’m not certain that I can make sense of what the ‘acquaintance’ category of knowledge comes to in its own right, in a robust enough sense that doesn’t collapse either into knowledge-how or knowledge-that, and thus into our present discussion. This point notwithstanding, however, one response I have to Conee’s account is just to accept it: indeed I have sometimes used the idiom of acquaintance to express the phenomenal knowledge Mary (or any of the ability-learners we considered) gains when she attends to what her new experience is like. In that case it seems that Conee and I simply disagree over this point: he is certain that such phenomenal knowledge is non-factual, and I think the question, for all that has been said, is left open (in which case Conee’s account, if a genuine alternative to AH, will suffer with the same explanatory difficulty I raise for AH in this paper). Interestingly, his defence of the claim that the new acquaintance knowledge is non-factual (not of any new truth, in his terms) seems to rely on the idea of representing a property in different ways, where gaining a new way of thinking about a property in no way entails being able to have new true thoughts about the property (in Conee’s terms), or to know new facts involving it (in ours). In this case, Conee’s real target may turn out to be a form of the implicit premise in the knowledge argument identified above (note 1), to the effect that all representations of genuinely physical items must in principle be susceptible to capture in terms of physical vocabulary, and so ought to be available to black-and-white Mary. If this is what Conee denies then he may or may not be right, but this issue lies in a different arm of the debate over Mary (see note 2 also on this), and so I won’t consider it further here. 
^16	  Thanks to Frederik Willemarck, Jennifer Hornsby, Galen Strawson, Tim Crane, Torin Alter and Akosua Bonsu for helpful comments on various versions of this paper.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